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LEGAL ANALYSIS AND REBUTTAL 
Opening Note: Briefs by Appellees misrepresent the evidence in the record 
and rely on evidence not relied upon by the juvenile court in terminating Mr. 
H's parental rights. 
The Appellees—the State and the Guardian ad Litem (GAL)—misrepresent 
the evidence as found in the record. While most likely unintentional, such a 
practice is extremely prejudicial to the appellate process and destroys the integrity 
of appellate review. 
The Appellees misstate and mischaracterize critical evidence in this case as 
well as the findings of fact of the trial court. Furthermore, the Appellees rely upon 
evidence that, while in the record, goes beyond the findings of fact of the trial 
court. These are no trivial points because the evidence is the heart of this appeal— 
whether it was sufficient to terminate Mr. H's parental rights and whether Mr. H 
had notice to satisfy statutory requirements and constitutional due process. Mr. H 
objects to the Appellees' material misrepresentations of the record and argues that 
the misrepresentations prejudice this appeal and his attendant grounds for relief. 
While the purpose of the reply brief is not to engage in a lengthy exposition of 
these misrepresentations, the following are five important examples: 
1. The State claims that Mr. H visited his children "only once in person, and 
only once by phone in the course of almost two years."1 
This statement is clearly erroneous when referenced to the "source" 
of the facts. The State took these facts from the trial court's findings of 
1
 Appellee State's brief at 14. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fact—attached as an addendum to its brief. While the findings of fact say 
that indeed Mr. H had visited his children during Easter 2001 and had 
talked to them by telephone on October 31, 2003, there is absolutely no 
statement in the court's findings that conclude that these were the only or 
exclusive contacts Mr. H had with the children during the period in 
question. Indeed, the record is replete with other substantial, undisputed 
contacts Mr. H had with his children, namely frequent and regular 
telephone contact.3 
2. The State claims that "the Division did take actions which assured that 
Appellant had actual knowledge of the proceedings [involving his 
children]."4 
This statement is wholly unsupported by the facts of the record and the 
trial court's findings of fact. First, no where in the record was testimony 
even introduced claiming that the State had personally informed Mr. H of 
the proceedings. Second, while testimony was introduced at trial claiming 
that DCFS made some undocumented telephone calls to a phone number 
and some messages were left with a third person5, no evidence was ever 
introduced that Mr. H had knowledge of these proceedings through the 
2
 R. 430-31. 
3
 1 Tr. 114-116 
4
 Appellee State's brief at 15. 
5
 1 Tr. 25, 59-62 
o 
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third person. That link in the chain of notice is wholly lacking, although 
even if it did exist, it would be insufficeint. 
Furthermore, the testimony of A.C. at trial, who testified that she spoke 
to Mr. H and informed him of a court proceeding some five months after 
the children were removed from the custody of their mother, did so at her 
own volition and not at the request of the State.6 
Thus, the State did nothing that provided any actual or legal notice of 
the hearings to Mr. H, and the State's assertion here is false. 
3. The GAL claims that "[i]n April 2001, the case worker left messages telling 
the Father the Children were in state's custody. She continued to call him 
and leave messages during the next two months, yet [Mr. H] did nothing to 
help them or involve himself in the process. 1 Tr. 28. R 431." 
The GAL misrepresents the facts here in at least two ways. 
First, the cited reference to the transcript clearly shows that the 
caseworker openly admitted that she did not begin attempting to contact 
Mr. H about the children's removal until May or June 2001, in violation of 
statutory notice requirements.7 This is significant because it illustrates the 
lackadaisical attitude that DCFS and the Attorney General's office have had 
about Mr. H and notifying him of the State's action regarding the children. 
Even if the caseworker had been able to contact him in May or June 2001— 
6 l T r . 84-85. 
7
 1 Tr. 29-30, U.C.A. §§ 62A-4a-202.2 - 202.3; 78-3a-306 - 307, 309 
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1 
at least one full month after the shelter hearing—it would have been too 
late to intervene and assert custody at the shelter hearing or even appeal the i 
order from that shelter hearing. 
Second, the caseworker explicitly said that she never left messages 
o 
when she called the telephone number she had for Mr. H. 
4. The GAL similarly claims that "the case worker made numerous telephone 
calls to the Father, leaving messages to the effect that the Children had been 
removed. R.431 She kept up the telephone calls for the next two 
months."9 
Again, the GAL misrepresents the record here on two accounts. 
First, the record is crystal clear that the caseworker never left any 
messages with a third party that the children were removed. The 
caseworker's own testimony was that four or five times in October 2001 
she called a telephone number given to her by the children's mother and left 
a message with a female person who answered.10 The substance of the 
message was that she was the caseworker for the children and asked that 
Mr. H call her back. Contrary to the misrepresentation of the Guardian ad 
Litem, the message the caseworker left did not tell Mr. H that the children 
had been removed from the care of their mother.11 This is an important 
8lTr.25-26. 
9
 Appellee Guardian ad Litem at 4. 
10
 lTr. 59-60. 
11
 lTr. 59-60. 
d 
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distinction because a central issue to this appeal is how much Mr. H knew 
about the proceedings involving his children. Even if he had received the 
messages—which was never shown at trial, Mr. H would have never 
known from this message that the children had been removed by the State 
from their mother's custody. The caseworker never said that the children 
had been removed; only that she was the caseworker for the children. 
Second, the GAL misrepresents the truth about the frequency of the 
calls and messages. The initial caseworker testified that she received a 
telephone number from the children's mother that was reportedly for the 
residence of Mr. H and made "at least five" phone calls to the telephone 
number over two months (May - June 2001).13 This caseworker never left 
a message and never spoke to anybody.14 The second caseworker made a 
four or five telephone calls purportedly to the residence of Mr. H in 
October 2001 and left the messages as described above. Those phone calls 
were all made within a week's time. 
Therefore, there was no caseworker that left a series of messages 
over several months saying that the children had been removed. That is a 
fiction. 
1 Tr. 59-60. 
1 Tr. 25 
1 Tr. 25. 
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5. 
I 
was hiding from the Division because he, [Mr. H] didn't want to be i 
responsible for the children."15 
Again, this is a fiction, unsupported by the record. Reviewing the 
GAL's citation for this "fact," it is entirely unclear about who told her that 
Mr. H did not want to be responsible for his children's welfare—it could 
have been DCFS gossip for all we know. 
The record reads: "I visit the home. I asked the family contact. What 
I was told was that they hadn't heard from him, he hadn't been paying child 
support, he was hiding from them because he didn't want to be responsible 
for the children."16 But the caseworker could not have meant that she had 
talked to Mr. H's family because a few seconds later, the caseworker 
admitted that she had never visited Mr. H's home or reached Mr. H's 
family by telephone. 
Therefore, again, the assertion that Mr. H's family had told the 
caseworker that Mr. H was trying to evade responsibility for his children is 
unfounded and unsupported by fact. 
15
 Appellee GAL's brief at 4. 
16
 1 Tr. 37. 
17
 1 Tr. 25-26, 37. 
6 
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There are numerous other facts that the Appellees misrepresent, such as 
whether Mr. H paid money toward the care of his children , whether Mr. H ever 
had contact information for his children's caseworkers when the caseworkers 
either never left messages or it was never proven that he did receive any alleged 
messages, whether Mr. H inquired about the children, sent them letters, cards, gifts 
or money,19 whether Mr. H was notified about the visit with the children that the 
mother had allegedly arranged with DCFS , and that the main sources of 
information about Mr. H were the mother and the maternal grandmother of the 
children—who were clearly adverse parties—and intentionally deceived Mr. H 
about the whereabouts and welfare of the children.21 
All of these misrepresentations—and there are more—are prejudicial to Mr. 
H's claims and arguments in this appeal. The misrepresentations, moreover, are 
not trivial, but go to the heart of Mr. H's case and thus create confusion over facts 
that are not reasonably in dispute. On these "facts" that Appellees have 
misrepresented, reasonable minds are not likely to differ as to their interpretation 
because their meanings are clear when viewed in their context and chronology. 
Such material misrepresentations cannot be glossed over and calls into question 
the reliability and accuracy of Appellees' entire briefs. Thus, Appellees' factual 
analysis and arguments are fundamentally tainted and flawed. 
18
 1 Tr. 27. 
I 9 2Tr .43 . 
20
 lTr. 62-64. 
21
 lTr. 112-116. 
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1 
Furthermore, in its brief, the State uses and relies upon evidence not relied i 
upon in the juvenile court's findings. The State does this to bolster its claim that 
the facts are sufficient to support the termination order in question. 
i 
The State dredges up facts that far predate the removal of the children in 
April of 2001. The facts the State raises deal with Mr. H's knowledge of the 
mother's alleged drug use, etc. before the children were removed by the State. 
While these facts may be part of the record—they were introduced at trial by 
witness' testimony, the juvenile court overtly disregarded these "facts" as a basis 
for terminating Mr. H's parental rights. A question before this Court is whether 
the evidence before the juvenile court and its factual findings were sufficient to 
justify terminating Mr. H's parental rights. The juvenile court's findings of fact, 
then, are at issue here. Those findings make no references to any alleged facts that 
predate the April 2001 removal of the children from their mother's custody. The 
State's inquiry into these alleged facts go beyond the questions before this Court 
and only serve to prejudice Mr. H's position. 
On these two grounds—that the GAL and the State misrepresent the facts 
contained in the record and rely upon allegations not relied upon or supported by 
the juvenile court's findings of fact—Mr. H objects to the misrepresentations of 
Appellees. Accordingly, Mr. H requests that this Court appropriately filter the 
22
 Appellee State's brief at 2, 3, and 8. 
8 
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Appellees' Material "Facts" and factual analyses in their argument because the 
Appellees' factual misrepresentations render these sections inherently tainted and 
flawed. Mr. H also requests that this Court take whatever further action it feels 
necessary to remedy this unfortunate situation. 
I. The trial court's findings of fact are inconsistent and insufficeint as a 
matter of law to conclude abandonment, thus warranting vacation of 
the order. 
Neither the State nor the GAL even addresses Mr. H's arguments that the 
findings of fact are internally inconsistent and that they contradicted the 
conclusion of abandonment. Therefore, on these arguments, the State and GAL 
must be "satisfied with the statement provided by the appellant."24 
The briefs of Appellees focus on the sufficiency of the evidence to 
conclude abandonment. As already shown, the State and the GAL misrepresent 
the facts or rely upon facts not relied upon or found by the trial court in their 
analysis of this issue. This practice goes beyond, and does not even answer, the 
question before this Court. The issue is whether the trial court's findings were 
insufficient as a matter of law to conclude abandonment. Therefore, the scope of 
the issue is limited to those facts as found by the trial court and extraneous facts 
should not be considered. 
Because the State's and GAL's arguments on this issue rely upon 
extraneous alleged facts and misrepresentations of the facts, and thus do not even 
23
 Findings of fact are required under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
be made with specificity. 
24
 Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540 [^22 (Utah 2000) 
Q 
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i 
answer the question before this Court, this issue of sufficiency of the evidence 
should be held in favor of the Appellant, Mr. H. 
II. The State's egregious violations of Mr. H's absolute rights to 
immediate notice of the removal of his children and subsequent 
hearings, along with the violations of Mr. H's Due Process rights, are 
inextricably related to the termination proceeding, and the appropriate 
remedy is vacating the termination order. 
While the GAL agrees with Mr. H that the due process and notice 
violations were egregious, the State argues that it used reasonable efforts and 
made a good faith attempt to contact and locate Mr. H. 
Moreover, the State argues that the proceedings immediately after removal 
of Mr. H's children—to which he received no notice for nearly a year—"in no 
way compromised his parental rights."25 
Finally, both the GAL and the State dispute that vacating the termination 
order is the appropriate remedy, even if the State violated statutory notice laws and 
Mr. H's right to due process. 
a. The State did not make reasonable efforts to personally contact Mr. 
H as required by law and thus precluded him from asserting his 
interests in custodv and his right to appeal earlier orders. 
In its brief, the State alleges that it made reasonable efforts and a good faith 
attempt to contact and locate Mr. H. The State cites two "facts" in support of this 
claim. First, two caseworkers had made phone calls to a telephone number 
reported to be that of Mr. H. Second, the mother of the children and a foster 
mother had confirmed to DCFS that Mr. H knew what was going on with the 
25
 Brief of Appellee State at 16. 
in 
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children. While there is significant factual dispute as to these facts—which were 
not found by the trial court—even if true, either or both of these bases are legally 
insufficient to satisfy the State's burden of making reasonable efforts and a good 
faith attempt to locate Mr. H. Moreover, telephone calls are woefully inadequate 
and are facially insufficient in terms of providing legal notice; thus, it is fallacy to 
focus on the telephone calls that the State or a third-party allegedly made in this 
case. Notice by telephone—even if it was made in this case-is insufficient as a 
matter of law to satisfy statutory requirements, the rules of procedure, and Due 
Process. 
The purpose of notice is to give the opposing party a meaningful 
opportunity to address the claims made against him and to be meaningfully 
heard.26 Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that proper notice 
requires "apprais[al] of interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections.... But when notice is a person's 
due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process."27 Thus, "a State may not 
deprive a person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the 
State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him some real 
opportunity to protect it. [Citations omitted]" 28 
zo
 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-6 (1950), see 
also Dairy Product Servs., Inc. v. Wellsville City, 2000 UT 81, If 49, 13 P.3d 581. 
27
 Id. See also Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797-8 (1996): 
28
 Richards, 517 U.S. at 804: 
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1 
Thus, the Rules of Civil Procedure require a search of reasonable diligence 
in good faith.29 
In a case that came before the Supreme Court of Utah, the Court held that a 
reasonable search in this context requires a search reasonably calculated to 
actually find the parents.30 In that case, In re Pitts, the State had gained custody of 
children by alleged abandonment. The State attempted to locate the parents by 
checking with the post office, utility company, and the telephone book.31 Not 
being able to locate the parents through these means, the State published notice in 
a newspaper. When the parents appeared some six months after the alleged 
abandonment and the children were already placed for adoption, an appeal ensued 
on the order of termination of their parental rights.33 The Court found that 
checking with a hotel and the utility company, and consulting of a phone book was 
"not 'diligent inquiry' but the lack of'diligent inquiry.'"34 The Court particularly 
faulted the State with failing to check with relatives that would know the 
whereabouts of the parents.35 Because of the lack of a diligent search for the 
parents, the Court set aside the order terminating the parental rights.36 
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976): 
30
 In re Pitts, 535 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975). 
31
 Id at 1245-46. 
32
 Id at 1246. 
33Id 
34
 Id at 1246, F2 
35
 Id at 1246. 
36
 Id. at 1249. 
12 
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In view of this similar case, it is clear that in ten or so undocumented 
telephone calls, the State did not relieve itself of its burden of a reasonable search 
in good faith. The DCFS caseworker admitted at trial that she failed to consult a 
phone book38—although she knew the approximate whereabouts of Mr. H.39 The 
caseworker also admitted that she did not follow DCFS's own policies and 
procedures in an attempt to locate Mr. H.40 Furthermore, the caseworkers relied 
on a telephone number they received from adverse parties—the mother and 
maternal grandmother.41 The State made absolutely no efforts to locate or contact 
Mr. H besides these undocumented telephone calls. If the State was found not to 
have made a reasonable search in the Pitts case, where the State did more in an 
effort to locate the parents than in the case at bar, certainly the State did not make 
a reasonable search for Mr. H. 
Furthermore, five critical facts speak to the State's lackadaisical attitude in 
contacting and locating Mr. H, illustrating that the State was not sincerely 
interested in locating and notifying Mr. H. First, the DCFS caseworker—in 
knowing violation of the notice laws42—did not attempt to contact Mr. H until a 
full month or more after the children's shelter hearing.43 Second, the caseworker 
37
 See also an opinion (not yet published) from California, InreN.S., 2002 WL 
31270246 (Cal.App. 5 Dist.) 
38
 1 Tr. 35-41. 
39
 R. 11, lTr. 37-38. 
40
 1 Tr. 35-41. 
41
 1 Tr. 25, 59 
42
 1 Tr. 31. 
43
 1 Tr. 25. 
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testified that she did not feel it was important to contact Mr. H, even though he 
had a right to notice.44 Third, the caseworker suggested that it would have been a \ 
lot of work for her to place the children out of state with the father.45 Fourth, a 
DCFS caseworker, Ms. Covert, testified at trial that she had made a telephone call 
to a number she believed to be that of Mr. H and a woman answered the phone and 
allegedly confirmed Mr. H lived at the residence, but the caseworker never asked 
for the address of the residence in order to serve Mr. H or mail notice to him.46 
And fifth—and perhaps most damning—the State never attempted to file a Motion 
or Affidavit for Alternative Service, although required by law and the rules of 
procedure, after a reasonable search had been made.47 
The State cannot be willfully ignorant of the whereabouts of a known 
parent of children in the State's custody. The State did nothing to notify Mr. H but 
rely on information from adverse parties who testified they deceived Mr. H about 
the situation of the children. The position of the State is tantamount to equating 
a reasonable search with a caseworker glancing at her desk now and then to see if 
the parent's contact information has arrived on a silver platter. 
In summary, the extent of the State's search to notify and locate Mr. H was 
about ten phone calls to a number the State received from an adverse party. That 
1 Tr. 30. 
1 Tr. 50. 
lTr. 71. 
U. R. Civ. Pro. 4(d), U.C.A. §78-2a-31 l(3)(b). 
1 Tr. 112-115. 
14 
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is all. Clearly, this does not satisfy the notice requirements of the Utah Code and 
the Rules of Civil and Juvenile Procedure.49 
Furthermore, the State alleges that Mr. H was not victim of any Due 
Process violation. The State makes the novel and inconsistent argument that the 
State need not initially attempt to search for a parent, just send notice of a 
termination proceeding to the parent and hold a hearing.50 The fallacies here are 
obvious. First, the State is clearly under a duty, as already established, to make a 
reasonable, diligent search for the parents immediately after the State takes any 
action in juvenile court as to children. Second, the State is under the absolute duty 
to make some kind of service of a petition for termination—personally, or, if 
unable—after a reasonably diligent search—by publication. 
However, setting aside the clear notice violations and lack of a diligent 
search for Mr. H in good faith, the State clearly violated Mr. H's constitutional 
rights to Due Process51 under the same facts. 
"Due Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands."52 The Utah Supreme Court has held that "the 
deprivation of parental rights is a drastic action which must be handled through in 
49
 Including, but not limited to U. R. Civ. Pro. 4(d), 5(a); U. R. Juv. Pro. 13(b), 
18(b)(5); U.C.A. §§62-4a-202.2-3, 78-3a-306-307, 309, 311, 314, 407, and 408. 
50
 Appellee State's brief at 18, allegedly quoting State ex rel. J.R.T. v. Timperly, 
750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1988). 
51
 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1: No state shall. .. deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. 
52
 Smith v. Org, of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,848-9 
(1977). (as quoted in In re S.A., 37 P. 3d 1166, par 11 (Utah 2001)) 
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persounum procedures. Children are not realty, and rights pertaining to them must 
be handled with care and proper procedure."53 The Court has suggested that a 
"high standard of care and diligence [is] necessary in seeking out parents."54 
In this case, there can be no doubt that Mr. H's right to Due Process was 
violated by the State's refusal to make a search for him, serve him pleadings and 
notices, and afford him an opportunity to be heard early in the proceedings. The 
State and the GAL are correct in stating that time is of paramount importance in 
this kind of a case. Thus it is just as important for the parents to receive timely 
notice of proceedings and be appraised of the nature of those proceedings by the 
opposing party—not through a third party, even though the State wants to shift the 
burden in this case on the mother, foster parent, etc., to have given notice to Mr. 
H. 
Due Process, the Rules of Procedure, and the Utah Code squarely burden 
the State and DCFS to notify parents of proceedings involving their children. 
Parents have an absolute right to such notice. Mr. H is not arguing that "the State 
has some sort of absolute responsibility to track him down and drag him into 
court."55 Mr. H merely argues that the State must employ reasonable efforts to 
locate him and strictly follow the notification requirements as established by law. 
Arguably, had the State complied with the law, observed the notice 
requirements and their own procedures for locating a parent whose whereabouts 
53
 In re Pitts at 1248. 
5 4 Id 
55
 Appellee State's brief at 15. 
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are unknown, and made a reasonably diligent search for Mr. H, this case would 
have turned out differently. Mr. H could have asserted his interests in custody to 
the children, appeared in court early on, complied with reunification services if 
necessary, and appealed any adverse orders. But because of the State's complete 
failure to notify and respect Mr. H's Due Process rights, Mr. H has been 
absolutely precluded from asserting these rights except to attack a termination 
proceeding based upon abandonment and the subsequent termination order. Mr. H 
argues that the basis for abandonment—if it even existed, which he disputes—was 
direct result of the State's failure to comply with notice and service of process 
requirements. 
This is the heart of this case. The State violated the notification and Due 
Process rights of an absent party. 
b. The proceedings to which Mr. H never received notice directly 
compromised Mr. H's parental rights. 
The State further argues that the Petition to Terminate Mr. H's parental 
rights was properly served, so earlier violations of notice requirements and due 
process are not equitable grounds to attack the order terminating his parental 
rights. In support of this position, the State points out that the termination 
proceeding is separate and distinct from the other proceedings (shelter, 
permanency, adjudication, etc.). 
First, by definition and their very nature, the previous juvenile court 
proceedings dealt with custody of Mr. H's children, child support, visitation, and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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other issues that directly compromised Mr. H's parental rights. Thus it is 
completely disingenuous and inaccurate to assert that the prior proceedings "in no < 
way" compromised Mr. H's parental rights. 
Second, while termination of parental rights is a separate proceeding in 
juvenile court, it is virtually married to the other dependency proceedings. If there 
is no evidence of abandonment prior to removal of the children by the State, as 
was found by the trial court in this case, a parent's lack of involvement or 
participation in those proceedings, at the very least, sets the groundwork for a 
finding of abandonment by that same court—it sets the wheel in motion. 
Therefore, in the context of termination on the grounds of abandonment, the Utah 
Supreme Court has referred to a termination proceeding as the "default" judgment 
in child dependency matters.56 In other words, the failure of the parents to come 
forward and be involved in the court's proceedings, (or if there is sufficient 
evidence of abandonment prior to the proceedings), may cause the State will 
petition for termination of the parent's rights on the basis of abandonment. 
Thus the analogy becomes clear. Proper service of a notice of a default 
judgment would certainly not cure an initial failure of a plaintiff to serve the 
summons and complaint upon the opposing party. Similarly, the proper service of 
a petition to terminate parental rights cannot cure the petitioner's complete failure 
to make a reasonable search for the parent and properly serve the parent with 
notice and documents of previous proceedings. 
56
 In re Pitts, at 1246. 
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c. Vacating the order terminating Mr. H's parental rights is the 
appropriate remedy. 
The State and the GAL argue at length that vacating the order terminating 
Mr. H's parental rights is not the appropriate remedy in this case. On the contrary, 
vacating the order is indeed the only remedy for egregious violations of statutory 
notice requirements and due process rights. 
In In re Pitts, the Utah Supreme Court set aside the order terminating 
parental rights when the State had failed to make a reasonable initial search for the 
parents. 
Indeed because the juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and 
necessarily confined by the express limited authority granted by the legislature, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that "if the Juvenile Court does not comply 
specifically with the provisions of [applicable statutes] in a termination 
proceeding, any decree entered is in excess of its jurisdiction, is void, and subject 
to direct attack in a proceeding to vacate."57 Because the juvenile court did not 
comply, or order compliance, with due process and notice requirements designed 
to protect the interests of absent parties, the order terminating Mr. H's parental 
rights is beyond the court's jurisdiction and therefore void. 
Recognizing that juvenile proceedings are set in a civil context, the remedy 
is even clearer. A plaintiffs failure to serve process initially, or at any significant 
time during the proceedings, is nearly per se grounds to have a subsequent default 
In re Baby Girl Marie, 561 P.2d 1046, 1047 (Utah 1977). 
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judgment set aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. An 
entire litany of cases supports this view.58 ( 
The GAL argues that Mr. H "slumbered" and "sat on" his rights by not 
getting involved in the court proceedings when he allegedly knew that there were 
proceedings involving his children.59 However this conclusion lies on a critical 
assumption that makes the conclusion a fallacy. The unspoken assumption is that 
Mr. H knew that his rights were at issue. As a matter of law, his supposed 
knowledge is irrelevant until Mr. H is properly served. Any alleged "notice" that 
Mr. H had received through the grapevine was little more than gossip—and a 
complete red herring. Mr. H did not receive legal notice via actual service or 
alternative service if so ordered. 
But what is clear is this—that if the State had duly and appropriately 
complied with its duty to notify and serve Mr. H, he would have known that his 
parental rights were at issue from the beginning. This underscores the reasons and 
policy for personal notice—to apprise the opposing party of not only proceedings, 
but also the nature, substance, and issues involved in the proceedings. While at 
best Mr. H might have known that there were proceedings in Utah involving his 
children, there is absolutely no evidence showing that Mr. H knew that the 
58
 For example, see Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct.App. 1987); 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 
1975); Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P.2d 21 (1961); Utah 
Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, 22 P.3d 1249; Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 
249, 461 P.2d 465 (1969); Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986). 
59
 Appellee GAL's brief at 16. 
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proceedings involved his parental rights. Proper notice from the beginning would 
have cured this problem. Mr. H had an absolute right to such notice, but never 
received it. 
III. The policy and effects of the State's position with regards to notice is 
intolerable and severely dilutes Due Process rights. 
It may go without saying, but it is critical to recognize the effects of the 
State's position in this matter. The State's position is that a few phone calls to a 
telephone number received from an adverse party are a sufficient basis to satisfy 
due process and reasonable search requirements. 
This is a devastating policy that would almost completely absolve the State 
from any duty to attempt to locate out-of-state, non-custodial parents in a timely 
and proper manner. 
In this context, notice and Due Process requirements are substantively 
meant to protect the rights of absent, non-custodial parents and their children. 
Adopting the State's position in this case takes away any real teeth in enforcing 
notice requirements—effectively allowing the plaintiff to serve the notice of a 
hearing on default before the defendant is ever properly served the summons and 
complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of Appellees' misrepresentations to this Court as to the facts of 
this case and failure to respond, The Appellees State and GAL failed to 
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substantively attack Mr. H's arguments that trial court's findings of fact were 
insufficeint as a matter of law. 
The State did not make reasonable efforts in good faith to search out, 
locate, and contact Mr. H. A few phone calls does not a reasonable search make. 
The State violated numerous statutory notice laws and Mr. H's right to Due 
Process. The proceedings prior to termination, to which Mr. H never received 
proper notice or service, and the termination proceeding itself are inherently 
related, much like a hearing on default is with a civil complaint. The utter failure 
of the State to serve him properly for eleven months created the circumstances of a 
fictitious "default" because Mr. H did not involve himself in proceedings to which 
he was never properly invited. 
Vacating the order terminating Mr. H's parental rights is the only proper 
remedy in this case because the order was beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court and therefore void. Furthermore, vacating the termination order is 
customary in a substantiated attack on the sufficiency of initial service, including 
proceedings in the juvenile court. 
Finally, this Court should reject the State's position that notice and due 
process requirements were complied with in this case. Such a position effectively 
dilutes those rights into oblivion and absolves the State of any duty to locate 
absent, non-custodial parties in juvenile proceedings. 
A decision of this Court in favor of Mr. H would only affect juvenile cases 
in a very narrow set of circumstances—when termination of parental rights is 
22 
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based upon alleged abandonment that occurred (1) after the State removed the 
children and (2) before proper and legal service to the parent. Under these narrow 
circumstances, the order of termination ought to be void and vacated as a matter of 
law. 
For these reasons, Appellant Mr. H requests that this Court vacate the lower 
court's order terminating his parental rights. 
DATED and EXECUTED this 30th day of October, 2003. 
JJ. Danielson 
Attorney for Mr. H 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, In the Interest of PITTS, Erika R. 
and Pitts, Vallarey L., 
persons under 18 years of age, Gloria Gandy, 
Appellant. 
No. 13882. 
May 14, 1975. 
The Juvenile Court District No. 2, Salt Lake County, 
Judith F. Whitmer, J., entered order permanently 
depriving parents of custody and terminating all 
parental relationship of and to their two minor infant 
girls and placed girls with agency for adoption, and 
the mother appealed. The Supreme Court, Henriod, 
C.J., held that a child should not be taken from its 
parents save by clear and convincing evidence of 
intention to give up parental rights, something almost 
akin to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
there was want of diligent inquiry in attempt to locate 
parents where, among other things, no attempt was 
made to contact the maternal grandmother, the State 
did not inquire of paternal grandmother as to the 
father's whereabouts and notice of publication of 
petition for termination was made only in a weekly 
newspaper having comparatively small circulation in 
the county. 
Order set aside. 
Crockett, J., concurred separately and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
i l l Infants ^ ^ 1 7 8 
211kl78 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 21 Ik 16.8) 
A child should not be taken from its parents save by 
clear and convincing evidence of intention to give up 
parental rights, something almost akin to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
J21 Infants €^=>198 
21 Ik 198 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 21 lkl 6.7) 
There was no diligent inquiry to locate the parents 
prior to permanently terminating parental rights 
where, among other things, there was no evidence of 
any effort to locate father except for alleged 
telephone check with post office, power company 
and a hotel, there was no inquiry of any persons or 
relatives or anything else with respect to the father, 
publication of notice of deprivation of parental rights 
was made in small weekly newspaper having 
circulation of about one percent of that of the largest 
metropolitan daily paper and no effort was made to 
contact the children's maternal grandmother. 
*1245 Gordon F. Esplin, of Salt Lake County Bar 
Legal Service, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Frank V. Nelson, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for the State. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice: 
Appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate a 
juvenile court order permanently depriving the 
parents of custody and terminating all parental 
relationship of and to their two minor infant girl 
children, and placing them with an agency for 
adoption. It is adjudged that said order (July 16, 
1974) be vacated as prayed. 
This case is here solely on the record before us 
having to do only with the motion to vacate, the 
evidence adduced at the hearing thereon, the order 
denying it, October 17, 1974, and the order of 
permanent deprivation, July 16, 1974. The two 
orders above followed the delivery of the children by 
the paternal grandmother, Hattie Pitts, to a Welfare 
Department 'shelter' on or about November 9, 1973, 
(because, as the record reflects, she was financially 
incapable of supporting them). 
One Carlson, an employee of the State Division of 
Family Services, testified that he filed a petition on 
November 30, 1973 (which is not in the record before 
us), which contained allegations that the children had 
been left with an acquaintance at a Baywood Hotel, 
where some days later the room caught fire, and the 
children thereupon were delivered to Hattie;JTNJJ 
that the whereabouts of the parents were unknown, 
and that the parents had failed to provide adequate 
support and supervision for the children. This 
petition was heard on January 8, 1974. Prior thereto, 
said Carlson, he had 1) 'checked with the post-office 
to see if the father or mother were listed as receiving 
mail in the Salt Lake Valley,' receiving a 'No' answer. 
He then checked the Baywood Hotel (after the fire 
that apparently caused a transfer of the children to 
Hattie), to see if the parents were getting mail there, 
then checked with the local power company to see if 
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they were customers, being told they were not, after 
which he filed in the clerk's office, the petition with 
an affidavit for publication *1246 of notice thereof,— 
and that's all he did. 
FN1. Who, as stated above, delivered them 
to the shelter. 
One Meyers, who is completely unidentified in the 
record, said he did two things after Carlson had made 
inquiries, which were done in January or February, so 
that they were done long after the petition was filed 
on November 30, 1974, and hence of no probative 
value whatever in connection with 'due diligence' in 
locating the parents.ITN21 
FN2. We list his efforts here, for 
informational purposes only and to show not 
'diligent inquiry' but the lack of 'diligent 
inquiry,' and to show that even though he 
may have made the effort before the petition 
was filed, in no way would it have been the 
kind of diligence required to strip away from 
a mother and father all parental rights. He 
went to Hattie's home, and was told that she 
did not know where Gloria, the mother of 
the children, was, but there is no evidence 
whatever, to indicate that be bothered to ask 
where Hattie's own son, the father of the 
children, was. Then he looked in the phone 
book to see if he could locate Clara Gandy, 
the maternal grandmother. He said 'I found 
four Gandys listed, none of which were Mrs. 
Gandy.' There is nothing in the record to 
indicate he called any of those listed, but it 
is highly significant that he said one was a 
wrecking company. Two of the three 
numbers of persons listed represented the 
same phone, and the same address, and 
referred to a husband and wife. A bit of 
'diligent inquiry' would have shown this fact, 
had he looked in Polks 1974 Salt Lake City 
Suburban Directory on page 312. Such bit 
of'diligent inquiry' would have revealed in 
the same directory on the same page, the 
listing of a Mrs. Clara Gandy,--the name of 
the very person he was seeking. 
A Mrs. Lu Jean Smith, D.F.S. worker, testified that 
she knew Hattie when the latter brought the children 
to the shelter and said she didn't know where the 
parents were. She checked with the baby sitter who 
had been at the Baywood Hotel, who didn't know 
where they were either. 
Betty Mattson, another D.F.S. employee, knew the 
children's mother. This employee said she filed a 
Petition for Permanent Deprivation of the parental 
rights on May 9, 1974, since 'the parents had not 
made contact' with the children 'since November 9, 
1973 . . . a period of more than six months' FFN3] and 
'it appeared to me that neither parent was going to 
return at that point.' She also said she signed an 
Affidavit for Publication of Notice. Finally, after the 
July 16, 1974, hearing and order of Permanent 
Deprivation, Miss Mattson had contact with the 
mother between August 5 and 10, 1974, when the 
latter, after returning to Salt Lake, had called upon 
the former inquiring as to the whereabouts of her 
children,--when Mattson told the mother in no 
uncertain terms that 'she had been permanently 
deprived' of the children and that 'the children were 
being placed for adoption, and that she could not see 
them,'-nor would Mattson 'tell her the foster home at 
which they were placed' and that she (the mother) 
seemed upset. 
FN3. It was six months to the day, which 
suggests an unwarranted and premature 
effort to place these children out for 
adoption before the parents' return (which 
the petition she filed called for), and the 
resulting default judgment of July 16, 1974, 
ordered placement of the children with 
D.F.S. 'for placement in a suitable adoptive 
home.' 
Based on the evidence as recited above, the juvenile 
court made a finding of fact that The efforts of the . . 
. Division of Family Services to locate an address for 
the parents were diligent pursuant to Section 55-10-
88, Utah Code Annotated 1953.' 
[11f2] It is suggested that the evidence recited above 
clearly indicates that there was no 'diligent inquiry' 
made and that this matter is dispositive in favor of the 
mother and father of these children, if, for no other 
reason than that there is no evidence whatsoever, of 
any effort to locate the father except for an alleged 
telephone check with the postoffice, power company, 
and a hotel where there is no evidence that either 
parent resided, and a doubtful Publication of Notice, 
so far as this record is concerned, there having been 
no inquiry of any persons or relatives or anything else 
with respect to the children's father. In *1247 
addition to and a further weakening of such weakness 
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of inquiry, the following uncontradicted facts are 
reflected in the record to enhance the ridiculosity of 
permanently stripping parents of their parental 
rights,-which means forever, gentle reader: 
Gloria Gandy, is the mother of the children, 
Lawrence Pitts is the father, and his mother, Hittie 
Pitts, is the paternal grandmother. Clara Gandy is the 
maternal grandmother. 
In October or November, 1973, Gloria saw Hattie to 
see if she would take care of the children for awhile., 
while she (Gloria) was gone. She did not leave therm 
at that time with Hattie for some undisclosed reason., 
but left them with Wanda Brown, a friend, who was 
happy to have them and wanted to keep them until 
she got back. Gloria told her to keep them a few 
days, then take them to Hattie. She went to Tampa, 
Florida, was there with the children's father until the 
following July, during which time she tried to make 
contact with the children. She called her mother 
several times and wrote to Hattie, with no reply. She 
got in touch with her mother, through her sister, who 
answered the phone, about April or May, near her 
birthday. She gave her sister her address and asked 
who the kids were. She kept writing to Hattie, with 
no response. When she came back she called on 
Hattie but was told the latter had moved. Then she 
saw her mother who told her the children were up for 
adoption. She called Betty Mattson who told her she 
couldn't see the children nor would she be told where 
they were. At this juncture she hired a lawyer; she 
volunteered that: 'I love my children very much and 
really do care for them. . . . I just had to leave town 
but was planning to send for them. I didn't think 
anything like this would happen. No one contacted 
me about the proceedings with the Court.' She talked 
to her mother the end of July or in August, 1974. On 
cross-examination she said she went to Tampa 
because she 'was in trouble with the law.' No reason 
therefor was requested and none was volunteered. 
She said she didn't expect Hattie to take care of the 
children, but knew she would manage, and that she 
didn't think she'd be gone away so long. Asked if the 
postoffice returned any letters she sent to Hattie, she 
said 'no, why should they?'—which makes sense. 
Gloria's mother, Clara Gandy, said the Division of 
Family Services did not contact her at any time. She 
didn't contact Gloria until July or August. She said 
Gloria contacted her other daughter by phone, that 
she, Clara, tried unsuccessfully to contact Hattie until 
August and was told that she took the children to he 
Welfare. She said no one contacted her by mail, 
phone or personally to ask where Gloria was. There 
is no evidence that the other daughter ever was 
contacted. She said her daughter gave her Gloria's 
address around March or April, 'after the kids' 
birthday.' Counsel for the court, at some length, and 
in a somewhat uncavalier manner, elicited an answer 
from Hattie to the effect she didn't really know and 
was confused. Gloria, on the sideline, volunteered 
'Mom, I called you in March. It was right after my 
birthday.' Counsel for the court responded by saying, 
'Will you shut up and let her answer the question?' 
evincing some sort of inverted saintly effort to get at 
the truth, it would seem. The judge backed him up 
with an admonishment. 
The only substantial or effective impeachment as to 
the facts were on cross- examination of the grandma, 
Clara, who not only confessed her confusion as to 
what appeared to be a rather immaterial fact, but who 
obviously displayed considerable affection for her 
daughter and grandchildren. 
The facts abstracted above presented by Gloria are 
uncontroverted save as mentioned above. The state 
presented only facts relating to time Gloria was 
absent, * 1248 and what some aides of the Division of 
Family Service did that was claimed to constitute 
'diligent inquiry.' 
It is significant that the children's grandmother, Clara 
Gandy, was a resident, knew Gloria's address, as did 
Gloria's sister. More significant is what the State did 
not do. It did not do anything showing any diligent 
inquiry with respect to the children's father,-and so 
far as this record is concerned apparently did not 
even inquire of his own mother where he was. It did 
not contact Clara, made no phone calls to any of what 
amounted to only two Gandys in the phone book, did 
not bother to examine the 1974 directory that 
presumably had all the names and addresses of all the 
residents in the Salt Lake area, and if it did examine 
such directory it failed to find the name and address 
of Mrs. Clara Gandy plainly printed therein. The 
weekly newspaper in which it published notice of 
hearing, had a comparatively small circulation in Salt 
Lake County, which likely may not have had as wide 
a potential for notification and which, in a case like 
this, along with other claimed acts of diligence, 
would seem not to constitute reasonable diligence in 
alerting someone, nor the most 'diligent' means of 
notice, since it is fairly common knowledge that its 
circulation is about one per cent of that of the largest 
metropolitan daily paper published in Utah, where 
the chance of reaching the parents here, or interested 
relatives who might be alerted, is one hundred to one. 
If the people involved in this case had shown as 
much compassion for the parent-child relationship, 
and less for split-second speed in procedure designed 
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to accommodate the baby market that flourishes in 
this country, whether black, gray, red or statutory, the 
State, with its facilities, certainly could have used 
better and faster means for finding the whereabouts 
of this mother. 
This writer is impressed with a concession made by 
counsel for respondent, nonetheless, to the effect that: 
Respondent cannot help but agree with appellant's 
contention that the deprivation of parental rights is 
a drastic action which must be handled through in 
persounum procedures. Children are not realty, 
and rights pertaining to them must be handled with 
care and proper procedure. Appellant, however, 
wants this Court to believe that such is an absolute 
standard which has very few exceptions, if at all. 
We believe such language comes close to our 
thinking to the effect that a child should not be taken 
from its parents save by clear and convincing 
evidence of intention to give up parental rights,— 
something almost akin to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The respondent, having made the quoted 
pronouncement must have difficulty,—particularly 
with that part about realty,-when it cites Redwood v. 
Kimball,[FN4] to support the chopping off of parents' 
rights, since that was a suit to quiet title to realty. 
This provokes some interesting language of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Walker v. Hutchinson City:{FN5J 
FN4. 20 Utah 2d 113, 433 P.2d 1010 
(1967). 
FN5. 352 U.S. 112, at 116-17. 77 S.Ct. 
200. at 202-203, 1 L.Ed.2d 178. 
'It is common knowledge that mere newspaper 
publication rarely informs the landowner of 
proceedings against the property,' and 'In too many 
instances notice by publication is no notice at all.' 
Certainly this language is quite apt in this case where 
a paper's circulation is so small as to be about one per 
cent of that which would be provided in a paper 
whose circulation is a hundred times as great in 
circulation,-all for a very few dollars more. 
Respondent's citing of Lloyd v. Third District 
Court,[FN6] also has its differences between the 
instant case, since it is a divorce action with so-
called marital res extant in this state. It is quite 
understandable *1249 that married people who have 
no other kinship, and who are adults, should be 
amenable to service by publication,-a lot more and 
perhaps with a little less 'diligent inquiry' than where 
a blood relationship is involved,- not the case two 
adults, a man and wife,-but between and adult and a 
minor. Some social service workers in their zeal, may 
be naturally the victims of some sort of biological 
myopia, or are unenlightened or calloused as to the 
depth of motherly affection, sometimes forgetting 
that blood is thicker than printer's ink, that absence 
makes the heart grow fonder, and that instinct itself 
waters down the oft-repeated, but as often trited 
aphorism that the welfare of the child is the only 
concern of the judiciary. They sometimes forget that 
even though a mother disciplines her child by 
administering a spanking, the one spanked almost 
always seeks asylum and confort in the very arms 
that administered the discipline. 
FN6. 27 Utah 2d 322. 495 P.2d 1262 
£1972}. 
We believe that the evidence in this case is almost a 
complete stranger to and hardly equates with that 
high standard of care and diligence necessary in 
seeking out parents when troubled human waters 
brew. Any fracture of such relationship should be 
condoned only by clear evidence of the highest 
quality. 
We are of the opinion and hold that the proof here 
does violence to the far reaching order of permanent 
deprivation of parental rights,-amounting to forever, 
which is a long, long time. 
ELLETT, TUCKETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, Justice (concurring separately). 
In view of the fact that that majority of the court are 
of the opinion that the order should be set aside, I 
voice no objection thereto. This, because I assume 
that opens the way for proceedings on the merits as to 
what should be done about these children. I realize 
that the requirement of diligent search for a parent in 
such situations is not without difficulties. 
Nevertheless there are circumstances where the duly 
authorized publication 'in a newspaper having general 
circulation in the county in which the action is 
pending' serves a necessary and useful purpose. It is 
authorized by our Rule 4(0(1), U.R.C.P.. and had 
since time immemorial been recognized as valid by 
our statutory, (see former Section 104-5-12, 
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U.C.A.1943), had by our decisional law, see Ricks v. 
Wade. 97 Utah 402, 93 P.2d 479: and 126 A.L.R. 
664. 
It is worthy of comment here that Rule 4(f)(l\ just 
referred to, was amended on June 26, 1972, to 
provide that if'. . . the court determines that service 
by mail is just as likely to give actual notice as 
service by publication, the court may order that 
service .. . ' may be made by mail. 
535 P.2d 1244 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits 
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 
not certified for publication or ordered published, 
except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has 
not been certified for publication or ordered 
published for purposes of rule 977. 
Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California. 
In re N.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 
Court Law. 
FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff 
and 
Respondent, 
v. 
BRENT S., Defendant and Appellant. 
No. F039957. 
(Super.Ct.No. 96902-2). 
Oct. 10,2002. 
County department of children and family services 
sought termination of father's parental rights. The 
Superior Court, Fresno County, No. 96902-2, Martin 
C. Suits, J., terminated parental rights. Father 
appealed. The Court of Appeal held that: (1) father 
was a presumed father, not an alleged father, and was 
entitled to reunification services; (2) department 
failed to exercise due diligence to locate him; and (3) 
termination of his parental rights prejudiced him and 
violated due process. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
111 Constitutional Law €^>274(5) 
92k274(5) Most Cited Cases 
1X1 Infants €=>198 
2llk!98 Most Cited Cases 
County department of children and family services 
failed to exercise due diligence to locate presumed 
father, and, thus, termination of his parental rights 
prejudiced him and violated due process; nothing 
indicated department's inquiries of mother about the 
father and his relatives, mother knew how to reach 
father's grandmother, department never followed up 
on indications that father was in Washington state, 
and the district attorney located the father. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14. 
JH Infants €^>155 
21 Ik 155 Most Cited Cases 
121 Infants €=^172 
21 lk!72 Most Cited Cases 
Putative father was a "presumed father," not an 
"alleged father," in dependency case and was entitled 
to reunification services, even though he did not 
formally initiate a parentage proceeding to establish 
paternity by blood test or sign a voluntary declaration 
of paternity, took child into his home for only three 
months, and allowed the mother to take child despite 
his prior concerns about drug abuse and lack of 
adequate care; the father openly held out the child as 
his natural child, never disputed the mother's decision 
to name him on the birth certificate, belatedly 
participated in the proceedings, and volunteered for 
blood test. West's Ann.Cal.Fam. Code § 7611, subd. 
(d); Welf. & Inst. Code § 316.2. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Fresno County. Martin C. Suits, Judge. 
David M. Thompson, under appointment by the 
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Phillip S. Cronin, County Counsel, and Nannette J. 
Stomberg, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
OPINION 
THE COURT. [FN*1 
FN* Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., 
Cornell, J., and Gomes, J. 
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*1 Brent S. appeals from an order terminating his 
parental rights (Welf. & Inst.Code. § 366.26) to his 
daughter, N.S. [FN1] Appellant first received notice 
of the dependency proceedings approximately three 
months before the originally scheduled section 
366.26 hearing. Further complicating matters, since 
the outset of the case, respondent Fresno County 
Department of Children and Family Services (the 
Department) characterized appellant as N.S.'s alleged 
father. Despite serious questions of whether 
appellant's due process rights had been violated and 
whether he was entitled to presumed father status, the 
court proceeded with its termination order. Appellant 
places the blame alternatively on N.S.'s mother, the 
Department, the court, and his trial counsel. On 
review, we conclude it was error to proceed with the 
termination hearing and will reverse with directions. 
FN1. All statutory references are to the 
Welfare and Institutions Code unless 
otherwise indicated. 
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY 
In July 2000, the Department detained four-year-old 
N.S. after her mother was hospitalized on a Penal 
Code section 5150 hold. The Department in turn 
petitioned the juvenile court to exercise its 
dependency jurisdiction (§ 300, subd. (b)) over N.S. 
based on the mother's mental health and substance 
abuse problems. On the face of its petition, the 
Department identified appellant as N.S.'s father, 
checked a box for address "unknown" and placed a 
question mark in a box marked "alleged." 
Neither at the initial detention hearing nor at any 
subsequent hearing did the trial court make any 
inquiry of the mother as to the identity and address of 
all alleged and presumed fathers as required under 
section 316.2, subdivision (a). [FN2] There is also 
nothing in the record to indicate what inquiry the 
Department made of the mother with regard to 
appellant. 
FN2. Section 316.2, subdivision (a) 
provides: 
"(a) At the detention hearing, or as soon 
thereafter as practicable, the court shall 
inquire of the mother and any other 
appropriate person as to the identity and 
address of all presumed or alleged fathers. 
The presence at the hearing of a man 
claiming to be the father shall not relieve the 
court of its duty of inquiry. The inquiry shall 
include at least all of the following, as the 
court deems appropriate: 
"(1) Whether a judgment of paternity 
already exists. 
"(2) Whether the mother was married or 
believed she was married at the time of 
conception of the child or at any time 
thereafter. 
"(3) Whether the mother was cohabiting 
with a man at the time of conception or birth 
of the child. 
"(4) Whether the mother has received 
support payments or promises of support 
with respect to the child or in connection 
with her pregnancy. 
"(5) Whether any man has formally or 
informally acknowledged or declared his 
possible paternity of the child, including by 
signing a voluntary declaration of paternity. 
"(6) Whether paternity tests have been 
administered and the results, if any. 
"(7) Whether any man otherwise qualifies as 
a presumed father pursuant to Section 7611, 
or any other provision, of the Family Code 
What the record does reveal, however, is that the 
Department initiated a search for appellant on July 
20, 2000. According to a form declaration of search 
dated August 3, 2000, the following records were 
searched: "DDS Records, Family Support, Polk 
Directory, Sheriff Records, County Jail, Prison 
Locator, Fresno telephone books, Adult Probation, 
Register of Voters, Personal Property Rolls, SS/SSI 
Records, and MEDS." Checkmarks indicating "Yes" 
to the word "Located" were typed in the boxes for 
Family Support, Sheriff Records and Adult 
Probation. There was no indication, however, as to 
what information was located. In addition, the 
declaration states: 
"According to the Family Support Division, a letter 
was mailed to [a Vancouver, Washington address]. 
This address has been bad since March 1, 2000. 
Letters have been mailed to varies [sic ] agency 
requesting search of records for Mr. [S.] A letter 
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has been mailed to the State of Washington 
Department of Social Health Services [in 
Olympia]. Another letter was mailed to the State of 
Washington Children's Administration [in 
Olympia]. The last letter was mailed to the State of 
Washington Department of Corrections [in 
Seattle]. As to [sic ] the writing of this report, 
Brent [S.] has not responded to the letter mailed to 
him by the Department." 
*2 As to this last quoted sentence, there is no 
explanation in the record about the contents of the 
letter or the address to which the letter was 
addressed. Also, the declarant left blank the space 
below pre-printed language that stated M[t]he 
following attempts were made to locate the party 
through relatives, friends or others likely to know the 
present whereabouts of the party." 
In its social study for the dispositional hearing, the 
Department reported the mother was unable to 
provide information on how to locate appellant. She 
thought he might be living in Washington. The 
juvenile court then, in November 2000, adjudged 
N.S. a dependent child and removed her from 
parental custody. Although it ordered reunification 
services for the mother, the court denied appellant 
services by virtue of his alleged father status (§ 
361.5, subd. (a)). The court made no finding at this or 
any prior hearing that appellant's whereabouts were 
unknown or that the Department made a diligent 
search for appellant. 
After six months of unsuccessful reunification 
services, the mother expressed a willingness to 
forego further efforts to reunify with N.S. She also 
supported her father's request for N.S.'s placement 
with him and his wife in their Wyoming home. The 
Department in the meanwhile initiated a request for 
an Interstate Compact for Placement of Children 
(ICPC) evaluation with the State of Wyoming. 
At a six-month review hearing conducted in June 
2001, the court terminated reunification services and 
set the case for a section 366 .26 hearing. It also 
authorized respondent to serve appellant with notice 
of the section 366.26 hearing by publication. 
Notably, although its social worker claimed that a 
"Parent Search" was recently completed and 
appellant's whereabouts were unknown, the 
Department did not produce a declaration of search in 
support of its claim. The social worker also reported 
there was no identifying information to locate 
Page 3 
appellant. 
Then, on July 13, 2001, a Department social worker 
received a telephone call from appellant. He reported 
he had received a letter about N.S. and child support 
and in the process learned for the first time that she 
was a juvenile dependent, placed in foster care. The 
record does not reveal the identity of the letter's 
author or the contents of the letter. County counsel 
later argued the family support division apparently of 
the Fresno County District Attorney's Office sent the 
letter. The letter was mailed to appellant at his 
father's house in Washington state. 
Appellant acknowledged in the July 13th 
conversation that he had not seen N.S. " 'for so long,' 
" since she was about two when she lived with him 
for approximately three months. According to 
appellant, N.S.'s mother, whom he described as " 
'really weird' [and] 'pretty crazy,'" had run away. She 
would call and tell him he would never see N.S. 
again. Claiming that the mother despised him and 
should have just called him, appellant said he felt 
"bad that I have to fight for my daughter now." 
*3 Having only recently been assigned the case, the 
social worker promised to call appellant in a week 
after she reviewed the case. The social worker did 
inform appellant of the scheduled section 366 .26 
hearing. However, she gave him the wrong hearing 
date. She also advised him to "show up" for the 
hearing. Appellant gave her his address and phone 
number in Vancouver, Washington. 
Approximately a week later, the social worker had 
another telephone conversation with appellant. She 
informed him of when N.S. was detained and the fact 
that the court did not order services for him because 
he was an alleged father. Appellant repeatedly stated 
he was N.S.'s father. According to appellant, his 
name was on her birth certificate and he would do " 
'whatever to prove that.' " He wanted N.S., whom he 
said he loved, to be placed with him. 
The social worker explained to appellant that N.S.'s 
case was "in the process of [adoption] assessment." 
She added she needed to consult with N.S.'s therapist 
about appellant having contact with N.S. since, 
according to appellant, he had not had a relationship 
with her since she was about two. Appellant 
volunteered he " 'should never let her mother get 
[N.S.]' " and reiterated he was going to fight for his 
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daughter. 
Although the social worker promised to get back to 
appellant, she did not do so. Instead, in early August 
appellant once again called the social worker asking 
when he could call his daughter. The social worker 
replied she had not heard from the therapist as yet. 
Appellant became upset, urging he was N.S.'s father 
and asking why did he not have rights. The social 
worker reiterated her need to talk to the therapist 
because N.S. had been having problems after talking 
to her mother. 
Appellant questioned why the Department did not 
give N.S. to him since he was not "the one that got 
[her] into the system." As the social worker tried to 
explain the dependency process to appellant, he 
became angry "about how we (Dept) didn't look for 
him until it was too late for him." By this time in 
early August, respondent had formally served 
appellant with correct notice of the section 366 .26 
hearing. He told the social worker that the mother 
knew where he was and did not tell the social worker. 
The social worker responded by trying to explain a 
parent search to appellant but he again became upset. 
Appellant complained he was not given a chance 
with N.S. while the mother, who in his estimation 
was mentally disturbed, was. He again complained of 
how the mother ran away with N.S. and away from 
him. He added he and N.S.'s grandparents missed her 
and loved her. He apologized to the social worker for 
" 'being a jerk' " and thanked her for not hanging up 
on him. She told him she would contact him when 
she heard from the therapist. 
These three conversations were detailed in social 
worker narratives and brought to the court's attention 
at a hearing in late September 2001. Respondent had 
petitioned to terminate visits between N.S. and her 
mother. Meanwhile, the court had requested an 
update on the ICPC process. During the hearing, 
county counsel asked if appellant had been noticed 
for the hearing that day. He had not. County counsel 
and counsel for the mother agreed appellant had been 
requesting services, placement and contact with N.S. 
and yet, as county counsel acknowledged: 
*4 "we're looking at the child [who] is not a 
permanent placement, we're looking at an ICPC to 
send the child out of state and we're ignoring this 
father[.]" 
County counsel also admitted the narratives showed 
Copr. © West 2003 No Clai 
that appellant only became aware N.S. was: 
"in the system in July when he was contacted by 
Family Support and that he's been asking for 
contact and the social worker apperas [sic ] to have 
been putting him off saying that she's going to 
check with the therapist. I don't see where she ever 
checked with the therapist or ever got back to 
him[.]" 
Counsel for the mother advised the court that she 
did not support the father having contact with N.S. 
and urged the court to place her with the grandfather 
in Wyoming. The mother did personally admit to the 
court that appellant's name was on N.S.'s birth 
certificate. Nevertheless, she was apparently opposed 
to appellant obtaining presumed father status. 
Observing it was not his job to argue whether 
appellant was a presumed or alleged father, county 
counsel advocated against relying on the mother's 
representations and renewed the question of 
exploring appellant and his standing. The court 
eventually responded by appointing counsel for 
appellant, facilitating transportation for him and 
continuing the matter to the October date set for the 
section 366.26 hearing. 
Appellant appeared for the first time in these 
proceedings at the October hearing. Because his 
attorney had not received discovery and was 
unfamiliar with the record, the court continued the 
hearing to November 2, 2001. At the continued 
hearing, substitute counsel sat in for appellant's 
attorney who was absent. Respondent recommended 
the court find N.S. adoptable based on the 
grandfather's desire to adopt her and terminate 
parental rights. When appellant personally objected 
claiming "they didn't contact me in time," county 
counsel urged that "we need something from the 
father indicating what the issues are so we can 
respond." County counsel was prepared to proceed 
with a termination hearing. After further discussion, 
the court continued the matter once again, stating it 
would proceed on the continued date with the 
termination hearing unless counsel for appellant 
filed a motion to set aside based upon inappropriate 
notice. In turn, the court ordered a briefing schedule, 
a statement of contested issues and discovery on the 
issue of notice. 
In time for the continued hearing date, respondent 
filed a supplemental report regarding, in relevant 
part, its efforts to notify appellant of these 
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proceedings. It summarized the search it conducted in 
July 2000. It also reported the social worker 
"submitted a parent search" which was completed 
within a matter of days in November 2000 and June 
2001. There was no indication in the supplemental 
report as to what the words "submitted a parent 
search" entailed in each instance. At most, the 
Department offered what records are ordinarily 
searched. Missing were declarations or other 
evidence of what parent searches were in fact 
conducted in N.S .'s case. In addition, as had 
happened in July 2000, the Department again sent 
letters to multiple agencies in Washington state. In 
response to the November 2000 letters, the 
Washington agencies reported having no record of 
appellant's whereabouts. The June letters, on the 
other hand, finally led to the Department's acquisition 
of appellant's address. Notably, however, the 
Department apparently made no effort to serve him 
with notice as of the following month when he called 
the social worker. 
*5 Counsel for appellant, meanwhile, did not file 
either a motion to set aside or a petition for 
modification under section 388. At the eventual 
hearing in December 2001, the court permitted some 
testimony by appellant related to notice and N.S.'s 
parentage. 
On the issue of notice, appellant testified he had 
lived all his life in the Camas/Vancouver area of 
Washington state. His employment, first as a carnival 
worker and for the last two years as a union laborer, 
kept him on the road much of the time. Nevertheless, 
he considered the Camas/Vancouver area to be his 
"home base." For at least the last 12 years, his family, 
first his grandparents and later his father, owned the 
same residence. He also considered that residence to 
be his mailing address. He had taken N.S.'s mother 
there for Christmas visits and dinner in years past. 
N.S.'s mother maintained telephone contact with 
appellant's grandmother between 1996 and 1999. 
Even after the grandparents transferred ownership of 
the family home to appellant's father and moved 
elsewhere, N.S.'s mother still maintained contact with 
appellant's grandmother. This was how she reached 
appellant in 1999 asking for help with N.S. Appellant 
in turn came to pick up N.S. at the bus station in 
Fresno and brought her to live with him in his 
grandmother's home in the Camas/Vancouver area. 
The mother later took N.S. back, by traveling to the 
Page 5 
grandparents's home. 
On the issue of paternity, appellant testified he and 
the mother lived together for the year prior to N.S.'s 
birth. Although appellant was not present at the 
child's birth, his absence was not of his making. 
Rather, the mother ran off the month before N.S.'s 
birth and disappeared. Nevertheless, she named 
appellant as the child's father on the birth certificate 
and, two and a half months later when the mother 
needed help, she contacted appellant to care for her 
and N.S. He traveled to Imperial, California, near 
where N.S. was born, and brought the mother and 
N.S. to Fresno where he was then working in a 
carnival. Once in Fresno, appellant lived with N.S. 
and the mother, worked at the carnival to support 
N.S., and thought he and the mother had reconciled. 
However, two weeks later, the mother again left 
appellant and took N.S. to Imperial. Another time, 
when N.S. was approximately 11 months old, the 
mother reported to appellant that the person she was 
living with beat her and she had nowhere to stay. 
Appellant paid for a bus ticket for the mother and 
N.S. to travel and stay with the sister of appellant's 
current girlfriend. Appellant also paid part of the 
mother's and N.S.'s rent. Once again, at some point, 
the mother left with N.S. and appellant lost track of 
them 
Then, in the summer of 1999, a year before the 
Department initially detained N.S., the mother 
telephoned appellant's grandmother. The mother said 
she could not take care of N.S. at that time. 
Apparently, part of the mother's problem then related 
to drug abuse. When he received word of the 
mother's predicament, appellant, who wanted to have 
N.S. with him, traveled to Fresno to pick up the child 
and bring her to Vancouver. The child then spent two 
to three months living with appellant in his 
grandmother's house. At some point in the summer of 
1999 while N.S. lived with appellant, she became ill. 
Appellant sought medical care for her, going so far as 
to enroll the child with the State of Washington for 
medical benefits. He even considered going to court 
in Washington to get a custody order. 
*6 However, the mother traveled to Washington to 
take back N.S. When the mother arrived in the 
Camas/Vancouver area, she appeared to appellant as 
though she "wasn't skinny anymore" and "quit doing 
the dope." Appellant decided not to pursue custody 
proceedings because he thought the mother loved 
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N.S. and returning N.S. to the mother's care "would 
be the right thing to do." He acknowledged that at the 
time he could not take care of N.S. "that well" 
although his grandmother offered to help him. 
Nevertheless, he "figured [N.S.'s mother] was telling 
the truth" apparently about not using drugs. The 
mother then returned to Fresno with N.S. 
A month or two later, the mother contacted appellant 
saying she wanted $10,000 and if he did not give her 
money, N.S. was not going to see him. Appellant 
refused. Parenthetically, he admitted he never paid 
child support for N.S. Appellant heard nothing 
further from the mother following that conversation. 
He did not know where she was then because the 
mother told him different stories about where she was 
going or leaving. 
He admitted he did not make many efforts to find 
N.S. and the mother. At some undisclosed time, he 
knew acquaintances of his had seen the mother at the 
Fresno Fair. However, he did not go to Fresno then 
because he knew he could be arrested. In fact, when 
appellant first appeared in October 2001 for these 
proceedings, he was arrested for a probation 
violation. Apparently, five years earlier, he had 
committed what he termed "spousal abuse" involving 
N.S.'s mother. At some point, he pled guilty. 
In the midst of appellant's cross-examination, county 
counsel objected to further testimony. He argued the 
issues of notice and parentage were irrelevant 
because counsel did not file any pleadings 
articulating the disputed issues or citing authority for 
her position that appellant was entitled to relief. This 
led to considerable argument amongst the parties and 
the court. The court, for its part, did not rule on the 
relevance objection but did appear to agree with 
county counsel. Appellant's trial counsel reminded 
the court that she had not been present at the last 
hearing and was unaware the court had required her 
to file any pleadings. She argued everyone knew 
what the issues were: notice and paternity. The notice 
issue to her mind was "so obvious." The court 
disagreed. The court subsequently admitted the 
narratives of the three conversations appellant had 
with the social worker in July and August. After 
closing arguments, the court found N.S. adoptable 
and terminated parental rights. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Introduction 
Copr. © West 2003 No 
Appellant contends the juvenile court, instead of 
terminating his parental rights, should have 
granted him presumed father status and reunification 
services. Alternatively, he claims that his attorney's 
failure to file a motion to set aside the termination 
hearing or a modification petition amounted to 
ineffective assistance. Fundamental to both of 
appellant's arguments is his claim that his due process 
right to notice was violated. 
*7 Ordinarily at a section 366.26 hearing family 
preservation is no longer the goal of California's 
juvenile dependency law. Family preservation is of 
critical importance from the time the minor is 
removed from parental custody (§ 202, subd. (a)) 
through the reunification period. However, once 
reunification efforts cease, the scale tips away from a 
parent's interest in maintaining family ties and 
towards the child's interest in permanence and 
stability. (/// re Marilyn //. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309-
310, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544. 851 P.2d 826.) At that 
point, adoption becomes the preferred permanent 
plan. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 
1344, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 562.) 
By the same token, the interest of a parent in the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of 
his children is a compelling one, ranked among the 
most basic of civil rights. The state, before depriving 
a parent of this interest, must afford him adequate 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. (In re B.C. 
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689, 114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 
523 P.2d 244.) The means employed to give notice 
must be such as one, desirous of actually informing 
the absentee, might reasonably adopt to accomplish 
it- (/// re Antonio F. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 440, 450, 
144 Cal.Rptr. 466.) 
II. No Due Diligence 
[1] In order for the juvenile court's orders leading up 
to the section 366.26 hearing to be accorded finality, 
there is a "fundamental requirement of due process," 
that is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections. (/// re Emily 
R. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1351, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 
285: citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. 
(1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 
865.) 
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Where, as in this case, the Department alleged 
appellant's whereabouts to be unknown, the issue 
becomes whether due diligence was used to locate 
him. (/;/ re Emilv R., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1352, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 285; citing MulJane v. Central 
Hanover Tr. Co., supra, 339 U.S. at pp. 317 & 319.) 
The term reasonable or due diligence, as used to 
justify service by publication, denotes a thorough, 
systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in 
good faith. [FN3] Where the party conducting the 
investigation ignores the most likely means of finding 
the defendant, the service is invalid even if the 
affidavit of diligence is sufficient. (In re Arlvne A. 
(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 591, 598, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 
109.) 
FN3. Here it is undisputed there was no 
resort to publication as a means of serving 
notice on appellant. 
Appellant argues the mother withheld information 
while the Department blames appellant because he 
was frequently on the road and therefore his address 
was not reasonably ascertainable (In re Emilv R., 
supra, 80 Cal.App.4tli at p. 1353, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 
285). On the record before us, we conclude, as 
discussed below, the Department failed to show it 
used due diligence to locate appellant. 
Preliminarily, we observe that never once throughout 
these proceedings did the court make any finding that 
either appellant's whereabouts were unknown or the 
Department made a diligent search for appellant. It 
also never conducted its own inquiry into appellant's 
identity and location as required by statute (§ 316.2). 
In fact, the only times before the fall of 2001 that the 
court even mentioned appellant was at the November 
2000 dispositional hearing when it denied services to 
him based on his alleged father status and in June 
2000 when it authorized service by publication even 
though the Department never offered a declaration of 
due diligence. We point out these omissions because 
this is not a case in which prior findings were made 
and therefore were presumably correct unless 
appellant could show otherwise. 
*8 Particularly troubling, in light of appellant's 
undisputed testimony, is the lack of evidence 
regarding what inquiry the Department made of 
Copr. © West 2003 No < 
N.S.'s mother about appellant. The record is silent on 
this point. According to appellant's testimony, the 
mother knew his family, that they lived in the 
Camas/Vancouver area, and how to reach appellant's 
grandmother, if not appellant. The grandmother's 
telephone number was listed throughout this period. 
However, there is no indication in the record that the 
Department ever inquired of N.S.'s mother regarding 
appellant's relatives or friends, let alone why she 
thought he might be living in Washington. 
Identifying family or friends who could assist in 
locating a father is an obvious step in showing due 
diligence. (See /// re B.C., supra, 11 Cal.3d at 689. 
114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244.) Even the 
Department's declaration of parent search form is 
testiment to this common sense. As mentioned 
earlier, the form includes the statement: "[t]he 
following attempts were made to locate the party 
through relatives, friends or others likely to know the 
present whereabouts of the party." That portion of the 
form was regrettably left blank when the 
Department's social worker executed the sole 
declaration used in this case. 
While the Department concentrates its argument on 
the letters it mailed to Washington state agencies to 
establish its diligence, the first step, that is what 
inquiry it made of the mother, is utterly lacking. 
Consequently, it failed to establish that it pursued the 
most likely means of finding the defendant. (/// re 
Arlvne A., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 598. 102 
Cal.Rptr.2d 109.) Whether the mother was 
forthcoming or would have been so is not properly 
before us since there is no record to evaluate in this 
regard. 
We also note the record leaves unanswered a number 
of other questions about the Department's diligence. 
For instance, appellant testified of his employment 
over the years, yet the Department, according to its 
own showing, only checked once in July 2000, in 
"SS/SSI Records." In addition, the one declaration of 
parent search in the record refers to checking Fresno 
County telephone and address directories. However, 
given the mother's belief that he might be living in 
Washington, one has to question why the Department 
did not check directories from Washington state for 
appellant. Along the same lines, the Department 
learned early on in the course of its July 2000 parent 
search that appellant had a recent mailing address in 
Vancouver, Washington. Yet, there is no showing 
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that this discovery triggered any further inquiry of the 
mother or caused the Department to follow up and 
check records in that particular part of Washington 
state. 
Even in June 2001, once agencies in Washington 
state supplied the Department with what turned out to 
be the residential address of appellant's father as well 
as appellant's mailing address, the Department still 
took no action to serve appellant with notice until 
after he contacted the Department. Even then the 
social worker initially gave appellant the wrong 
section 366.26 hearing date. The Department's social 
worker also made no effort to notify appellant of on-
going hearings in N.S.'s case. Indeed, as county 
counsel once candidly admitted, despite appellant's 
requests for telephone contact or visitation with N.S., 
the social worker appeared to "have been putting him 
off." 
*9 Perhaps the most damning evidence which 
precludes a finding of due diligence in this case is the 
fact that apparently the family support division of the 
Fresno County District Attorney's Office did locate 
appellant through his father's residence. It was that 
agency's correspondence to appellant which led to his 
appearance in this case. In other words, another 
agency could locate appellant. Why could the 
Department not do the same? Again, the record does 
not offer any answers or explanations. 
With particular respect to the Department's effort to 
shift the blame to appellant, we reject its reliance on 
this court's decision in In re Emily R., supra. In Emily 
11, surra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 
285, we acknowledged that due process does not 
require impracticable searches. However, the 
circumstances in Emily R. were factually and legally 
distinguishable from the present case. In Emily R., an 
alleged father whose parental rights had been 
terminated attacked the use of notice by publication. 
He argued the agency involved failed to exercise due 
diligence, ignoring the most likely means of finding 
him. Unlike the situation in this case, the Emily R. 
trial court repeatedly made findings which were 
presumptively correct that the alleged father's 
whereabouts were unknown and that reasonable 
efforts had been made to locate and notify him. (In re 
Emily R., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348-1349, 96 
Cal.Rptr.2d 285.) Also, the alleged father in Emily R 
., unlike appellant here, offered no evidence that the 
agency could have ascertained his current address. 
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Given the Department's failure to establish that it 
exercised due diligence to locate appellant, the 
juvenile court could not properly proceed with the 
section 366.26 hearing and terminate parental 
rights. As further discussed below, in light of the 
undisputed evidence that appellant qualified as a 
presumed father, the court's error was prejudicial. 
III. Paternity 
[2] Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) 
provides that a man is presumed to be a child's father 
if he "receives the child into his home and openly 
holds out the child as his natural child." There is a 
significant distinction between presumed and alleged 
fathers in a dependency case. Presumed fathers have 
a right to reunification services; alleged fathers do 
not. (Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 CaUth 1043, 
1051, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 898 P.2d 891; /// re Emily 
/?., supra. 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1354-1355, 96 
Cal.Rplr.2d285.) 
Here, the facts presented were sufficient to establish 
that appellant was N.S.'s presumed father under 
Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). (Glen C. 
v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 585-
586, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 103.) He received N.S. into his 
home in the summer of 1999 and also helped provide 
a home for her on at least two prior occasions. He 
openly held out N.S. as his natural child, starting 
shortly after her birth when the mother contacted him 
and asked for help. He never disputed the mother's 
decision to name him as N.S.'s father on the birth 
certificate. Later, he even applied with the State of 
Washington for medical benefits for N.S. Once he 
learned of these proceedings and contacted the social 
worker, he repeatedly referred to himself as the 
child's father, to N.S. as "my daughter," spoke of his 
love for her, and his regret over letting the mother 
take her back in 1999. 
*10 Respondent nevertheless contends appellant was 
nothing more than an alleged father. The Department 
criticizes appellant because he did not formally 
initiate a parentage proceeding under section 316.2, 
seek to establish paternity by blood test, or sign a 
voluntary declaration of paternity. Respondent also 
focuses on the evidence that appellant did not 
financially support N.S., he took her into his home 
for only three months and at the end of that period 
allowed the mother take her away despite his prior 
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concerns that the mother was abusing drugs and not 
providing N.S. adequate care. 
We reject respondent's assumption that the juvenile 
court either did or could find appellant was only an 
alleged father. The fact that the father did not 
formally initiate a parentage proceeding under 
section 316.2 or sign a voluntary declaration of 
paternity is irrelevant under the circumstances of this 
case. Indeed, respondent's argument is disingenuous 
in this regard. Under section 316.2, subdivision (b), it 
was either the court's or the Department's duty to give 
appellant notice of his rights and his ability to admit 
or deny parentage, by providing him with Judicial 
Council form JV-505. [FN4] The form which is 
entitled "STATEMENT REGARDING 
PATERNITY" includes such options as "I do not 
know if I am the father of the child and I [blank] 
consent to [blank] request blood or DNA testing to 
determine whether or not I am the father[,]" "I 
believe I am the child's father and request that the 
court enter a judgment of paternityf,]" and "I have 
already established paternity of the child by ... A 
voluntary declaration signed by me...." On the reverse 
side of the Judicial Council form, there is also notice 
to an alleged father that "If you wish the court to 
determine paternity or if you wish to admit that you 
are the father of the child, complete this form 
according to your intentions." However, there is no 
indication in the record that appellant was ever 
served with such notice. Moreover, appellant's 
participation in these proceedings, albeit belated, is 
testament to his willingness to declare his paternity. 
Indeed, respondent's further criticism of appellant for 
not seeking to blood test ignores the evidence that he 
volunteered to blood test. 
FN4. Section 316.2, subd. (b) provides: 
"If, after the court inquiry, one or more men 
are identified as an alleged father, each 
alleged father shall be provided notice at his 
last and usual place of abode by certified 
mail return receipt requested alleging that he 
is or could be the father of the child. The 
notice shall state that the child is the subject 
of proceedings under Section 300 and that 
the proceedings could result in the 
termination of parental rights and 
adoption of the child. Judicial Council form 
Paternity-Waiver of Rights (JV-505) shall 
be included with the notice. Nothing in this 
Conr re Wp t^ ?nm Nn r\*\ 
section shall preclude a court from 
terminating a father's parental rights 
even if an action has been filed under 
Section 7630 or 7631 of the Family Code." 
Respondent's reliance on appellant's failure to 
financially support N.S. as well as the fact that he 
took her into his home for only three months and then 
allowed the mother to take her away despite his prior 
concerns is also irrelevant to the issue of presumed 
father status under Family Code section 7611, 
subdivision (d). Even appellant acknowledged he 
should have done more for N.S. Such evidence still 
does not undercut the undisputed evidence, however, 
that appellant received her into his home and openly 
held out N.S. as his natural child. 
Respondent's reliance on In re Ariel H. (1999) 73 
Cal.App.4th 70, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 125 is also 
misplaced. Ariel H., supra, involved an adoption 
action which a 15-year-old alleged father sought to 
prevent. Notably, the alleged father in Ariel H. 
presented no evidence that he was entitled to 
presumed father status under Family Code section 
7611, subdivision (d). In fact, he never saw the child 
nor did he publicly acknowledge his paternity. He 
instead tried to excuse his inaction by citing his own 
minority, an argument which the appellate court 
rejected. [In re Ariel //., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 
74, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 125.) Unlike the alleged father in 
Ariel H., appellant "promptly attempted] to assume 
his parental responsibilities as fully as the mother 
[would] allow." (//•/ re Ariel, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at 
73, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 125, quoting Adoption of'Kelsev S 
. (1992) 1 CaUth 816, 849, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 
P.2d 1216.) 
*11 In reviewing this record, we are struck by the 
fact that in so many instances a finding of presumed 
father status is supported by a fraction of the 
evidence presented here. We have no doubt that had 
the appellant appeared in these proceedings at an 
earlier stage, no court would have hesitated to grant 
him presumed father status on the undisputed 
showing he made. What motivated the court in this 
case is anyone's guess and frankly irrelevant given 
that our review extends to the court's actions and not 
its reasoning [Maneuso v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. 
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 88, 95, 283 Cal.Rptr. 300). In 
any event, we conclude the violation of appellant's 
due process rights was prejudicial given the 
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undisputed evidence entitling him to presumed father 
status under Family Code section 761 K subdivision 
(d). 
DISPOSITION 
The order terminating parental rights is reversed. 
The matter is remanded to the trial court with 
directions to enter an order declaring appellant to be 
the presumed father of N.S. and conduct further 
proceedings to resolve appellant's request for 
placement and, in the alternative, to order 
reunification services for his and N.S.'s benefit (see § 
§ 361.2 & 361.5). 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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